Confronting the Sunni-Shia Conflict

by Aun Ali

Read the original article in Muslim Voices Issue 2!

Too often the mainstream international media has focused on the differences and opposition between the Sunnis and the Shias. And in this process, it has largely muted the other facet of sectarian relations - the co-existence and harmony between the two groups despite their differences. The resultant is a fragmented image of sectarian relations that is in itself very problematic. But this distorted image also feeds into sectarian tensions around the world, given the influence of media on the construction and outcome of political conflicts in our globalized world today. It is therefore necessary to critically evaluate how media is depicting the sectarian conflict.

Karbala Basanay Walay (O’ the Cultivator of Karbala) …

A group of women were loudly reciting this elegy for Imam Hussain from the other side of the curtain, as I entered the men's side of the small hall inside the shrine. This was the shrine of Saint Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi, Pakistan that I visited one Thursday morning in Muharram last year. Muharram is the first Islamic month in which about 1400 years ago, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad , Imam Hussain, was martyred along with more than seventy companions on the plains of Karbala, Iraq . Each year millions of people around the world, especially from the Shia Muslim background, commemorate this tragedy with intense grief and passion as if this tragedy has just occurred recently. Saint Abdullah Shah Ghazi, a descendent of Imam Hussain's brother, Imam Hasan, was also martyred by enemy soldiers sent by the Umayyad Muslim ruler of the time. As I sat on the tiled floor, I noticed that a few men on my side of the hall were also moving their lips whispering this popular elegy along with the chorus.

Like the thousands of other shrines of Muslim saints all over South Asia , this shrine is also frequented by devotees from diverse backgrounds, and is by no means restricted to any particular sect. I later found out that this group of women comes to this place every Thursday for their Mehfil-e-Naat - a gathering in which they read certain verses from the Holy Quran in chorus and recite Naat (poetry) honoring the Prophet Mohammad . In Muharram , they also recite elegies for Imam Hussain. But they were not from the Shia background. From my previous visits and readings, I know that devotees even from non-Muslim backgrounds also come to this place. It could be the prayers, peace, inspiration, inner meaning, or some other reason or their combination that attract a steady stream of devotees to this shrine. What I find common in this attraction for all these people, including myself, is a shared feeling of devotion and spirituality, which parallels, if not transcends, the ambiguities, the contradictions, the contestations among our religious and sectarian boundaries. The Mehfil-e-Naat was also a reflection of that commonality.

That same evening of January 2007, as I tuned into international news channels, I saw grim images of attempted suicide bombings at various Muharram gatherings in Pakistan . These reports were followed by images and reports of even more saddening violence in Iraq, which had been taking a toll of an average hundred lives each day according to official statistics. "The roots of Sunni-Shia violence date back to a fourteen hundred years old schism," an area expert told the viewers in an authoritative tone on one of the channels. "The initial breaking point was the question of political leadership after the Prophet. But the sectarian identities fully crystallized after the crucial event of Karbala in which the Sunni caliph of the time killed the revolting Imam Hussain. The Shia became the followers of Imam Hussain. The sectarian differences and the conflict over these differences still continue today. The conflict assumes violent forms at times, as in present day Iraq and Pakistan ." The report ended with this comment, followed by another report on violence and killing in an African country. This time the given explanation was based on primordial 'ethnic differences' among certain groups.

While watching the news, I wondered how the cultural commonality I observed at the Ghazi shrine would fit into the above 'expert explanation.' And, where is the representation of this 'other facet' of sectarian reality in media? The news media has a natural attraction to reporting violence and out of ordinary events, but who is reporting this 'other facet' from the peaceful and ordinary routine of people's lives?

A few weeks later, I met a middleclass Shia businessman during a Muharram commemoration gathering. He came with a Sunni friend, who was also related to him through extended family. Constant death threats and an attempt on his life by a militant Sunni organization forced this Shia businessman to abandon his rural town in Punjab , and along with his family he moved to Karachi in the late 90s. It was none other than this Sunni friend that helped him settle in and establish his business. It would sound contradictory to some that a Sunni helped a Shia in a sectarian conflict. The front cover of the March 5th issue of Time magazine certainly would not suggest this possibility to its readers. Without any caveats or qualifiers, the heading read: "Sunni vs. Shi'ite: Why they hate each other." The provocative front cover must have attracted a wide readership. The inner pages instructed the readers, "How to tell Sunnis and Shi'ites apart" by the 'differences' in their names, mosques, dialects, accent, even the stickers on their cars. Allowing for a bit of nuance, however, the inner pages limited the application to only the Iraqi population and the current wave of violence.

One notices a kind of formulaic explanation underlying most of the news coverage: Define "Sunni" and "Shia" in distinct frames or categories. Simplify the complexities of their attitudes and behavior to distinguish them, without caring much for the variations in political and cultural experiences in different regions as long as the difference could be connected to the centuries old schism. Then label the ongoing violence with the adjective "sectarian" and tautologically assume the explanation of the violence in the same adjective, "sectarian," as in "sectarian politics" or "sectarian violence." The 'other facet' of sectarian reality that I note above is largely seen as an 'exception' or 'irrelevant to politics' in this explanation. And, why search deeper or elsewhere to find answers, when it could be conveniently situated in this formulaic explanation, especially, when there is a rush to do on-time reporting and survive and compete in the cut-throat environment of corporate mass media.

However, the mere existence of 'differences' within religious or ethnic groups does not automatically imply that they are the cause of political violence. The formulaic explanation does not help much in understanding why and how sectarian violence emerged in a certain place at a certain point in history and not at another. Take the Pakistani case, as an example, where bona fide scholars have drawn our attention to the politico-economic context - especially that of the 1980s when Pakistan hosted the proxy Afghan war - that largely account for the radicalization of sectarian identities and escalation of religious extremism in certain segments of the society. In some instances, these scholars suggest, sectarian violence would occur in an area due to local and personal reasons but would later merge into the broader national trend of extremism, caused by different reasons. The bottom line, according to these nuanced analyses, is that politics, policy, and interests transformed and radicalized sectarian differences rather than the other way around.

The local channels in Pakistan were an exception, however, to the abovementioned problematic trend in the news media. I closely followed the coverage of sectarian violence in early 2007, especially during the first ten days of Muharram - the main days of the commemorations. The news reports, the political commentaries, and the talk shows all made a keen effort to denounce violence in the name of religion, declaring that the perpetrators of these heinous crimes in the country could not be Muslims, and for the same reason, even moral human beings. Equally impressive were the ten day long coverage of Muharram commemorations by the government and private channels. The programs included recitation of poetry and prose, talk shows, documentaries, and reports on Muharram gatherings and processions. They were presented by devotees and mourners from diverse sectarian and cultural backgrounds. But the message was widely consistent: Imam Hussain sacrificed his life to save Islam. His personality, his message, and the commemorations in his honor are not restricted to any particular sect. Because of his sacrifice for justice and truth, he is a universal hero for all Muslims, and even for all of humanity.

The extensive coverage of Muharram commemorations in a manner similar to the Eid Festival and the Independence Day coverage in Pakistan is a recent phenomenon in the history of Pakistani channels. Some attribute the change to privatization of media in recent years, others point to the concerted efforts by the current establishment at curbing religious extremism, yet some others also mention the factor of market forces, and so on. But underlying all these factors, what is important to note is that the same tragedy of Karbala that is supposedly the root cause of Sunni-Shia division was actually serving as a point of their convergence! This religious commonality was actively utilized as a resource to create sectarian harmony among Muslims from various sectarian inclinations. This shared cultural resource, authentic to the cultural and religious character of the local people, had its appeal even among those traditional religious segments of the population, where calls for secular or liberal type moderations have failed thus far.

What I observed at the Ghazi shrine and on local channels during Muharram was also from the same society where we see incidents of sectarian violence and a rising trend of religious extremism. These observations can not be considered as irrelevant to politics or exceptions to the general trends of religious extremism. Yet this 'other facet' of sectarian reality is largely unreported in the international news media. The 'other facet' being the commonality among the Sunni and Shia based on shared beliefs, practices, and devotion, such as the Muharram commemorations. It is also the commonality of shared experiences, similar cultures, same neighborhoods, friendships, intermarriages, business connections, and so on. I call it the 'other facet' because it is the muted and suppressed facet that exists parallel to the violent facet, which we are already familiar with. By drawing our attention toward these commonalities, I do not mean to suggest that Sunni-Shia differences do not exist in those peaceful and harmonious segments of the population. No, the particular experiences and histories of the interaction between the two groups have definite impacts on the construction of their identities and politics. What is problematic is to assume that the differences necessarily mean opposition, that the differences are always the causes of political violence between the two groups. That is too simplistic, but unfortunately, very wide-spread in international media. My argument is that this simplistic portrayal becomes possible because of the omission of the 'other facet' of sectarian reality on the ground.

My concern about this omission is twofold. Firstly, the inaccurate and fragmented depiction of sectarian relations, with a focus on age-old differences, does not help much in understanding the ground realities of the political conflict in different regions. Why focus so much on differentiating groups from one another? Instead of simplistic and easy-to-use categorizations, why not just show the complexity and contradictions in reality, as they are? The distortion that results from this simplistic representation is very dangerous, because it can fuel hatred and multiply violence. Secondly, a focus on differences obstructs media's attention from noting the 'unexpected' - like the efforts that the 'other facet' may be exerting against hatred and violence, as noted above in the case of Pakistan . Such a narrow focus, consequently, curbs the possibility of imagining alternative solutions to sectarian violence, solutions that may involve bringing people from various religious and political affiliations together through their shared cultural resources, instead of dividing them up by solidifying their differences. The latter strategy evokes the memories of the colonial era in the minds of the indigenous people; manipulations based on 'differences' have proven to be the least successful.

The complexity that exists in the sectarian reality of Pakistan should warrant similar questions about sectarian relationships elsewhere, especially in Iraq . We ought to ask, where is the representation of that 'other facet' of sectarian reality in news media? Where is the coverage of commonalities - like shared religious and cultural practices, intermarriages, friendships, and tribal relations - that cut across the factional lines and are widespread in Iraqi society according to many scholarly studies? How is media covering the resistance that the 'other facet' may be exerting against the ongoing political and sectarian violence in Iraq?

In this age of globalized communications, media has a huge influence on political outcomes. The ripple effect of political conflicts in one region is now felt all over the world. The serious implications of fragmented and distorted images of sectarian conflicts in international media cannot be underestimated. We ought to be concerned about the kinds of policy solutions that these inaccurate images will produce. What kinds of maps are going to be redrawn and justified on the basis of 'difference'? What kinds of identities are going to be shaped by such fragmented images? What kinds of histories are going to be written based on such a distortion of reality? How would all this affect the future of sectarian politics for Muslims in one part of the world where they may not have direct contact with Muslims in other parts of the world, and they rely primarily on media for information? We must confront the 'difference' portrayed in the Sunni-Shia relations in international media, and we need to do this with an understanding of complex realities surrounding them in different parts of the world. We must allow the alternative voices of sectarian harmony to be heard as well.

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Aun Ali is a PhD student in the Sociology Department at the University of Texas at Austin. He can be reached at aunali@gmail.com. This article has been adopted from his larger paper published elsewhere.